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Under the Influence of California's New Drunk
Driving Law: Is the Drunk Driver's Presumption
of Innocence on the Rocks?

On January 1, 1982, the new California drunk driving law went into effect. This law makes it a crime to drive a motor vehicle where one's bloodalcohol level is .10 or more. The law also marks a legislative attempt to
curtail the practice of plea bargainingin drunk driving cases and signficantly increases the penalties imposed upon those convicted of drunk driv-

ing. This Comment will discuss the provisions of the new drunk driving
law and examine its constitutionality.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this country, the drunk driver is not thought of as a criminal
but as a mildly imprudent person coming home from a party or a
local tavern having had "one too many." The problems created by
drunk drivers are, in reality, quite appalling. One-half of all
Americans will be involved in an accident attributable to excessive drinking.' On any given Saturday night, one out of every ten
drivers will have consumed enough alcohol to be labeled "legally
drunk."2 Alcohol is disproportionately found in the blood of drivers involved in single vehicle accidents and in the blood of drivers
deemed responsible for multiple vehicle accidents. 3 Even more
startling is the fact that drunken drivers account for nearly 26,000
deaths and one million crippling injuries in this country each
year.4 Deeply concerned by the carnage on our highways caused
by drunk drivers, Los Angeles City Attorney Burt Pines
remarked:
It is time to recognize that a loaded driver is just as dangerous as a loaded
gun. Yet, while the laws require mandatory prison terms for people who
commit crimes with a gun, the drinking driver who threatens the lives of
countless other people on the road generally faces only a minimal fine of a
few hundred dollars and summary probation. 5

The California legislature is equally concerned with the
problems created by drunk drivers, and in the 1981-82 legislative
1. L.A. Times, Apr. 2;1981, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
2. Id.
3. 16 INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY No. 5, DRINKING-DRIVING
LAWS: WHAT WORKS? 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as I.I.H.S.].
4. L.A. Times, supra note 1, at 4, col. 1.
5. Id.

session more than twenty bills dealing with drunk driving were
introduced. 6 The resulting legislation was Assembly Bill (AB)
5417 which added, amended, and renumbered more than sixty sections and subsections of the California Vehicle Code.8 AB 541 appears to reflect a legislative policy decision which mandates the
elimination of drunk drivers from California's highways. As a result of the new legislation, a person charged with drunk driving is
more likely to be convicted and imprisoned or fined, or both.9
The new California drunk driving law (AB 541) changes the
previous law in three significant areas: in substantive law, in plea
bargaining, and in the penalties imposed on the drunk driver. In
the substantive area, the new legislation creates a new crime
which makes it illegal to drive when one's blood-alcohol level is
.10 or above.10 The new legislation also significantly impacts upon
the practice of pleading guilty to a charge of reckless driving in
lieu of prosecution for the more serious charge of "driving under
the influence" of alcohol. Under the old law, a conviction for reckless driving did not constitute a prior conviction for purposes of
sentence enhancement if there was a subsequent conviction for
"driving under the influence." Under the new law, however, a
plea of "guilty" to a charge of reckless driving in satisfaction of, or
as a substitute for, "driving under the influence," may constitute a
prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement." Finally,
the new legislation dramatically increases the penalties imposed
on a person convicted of drunk driving.12
While the new drunk driving law significantly alters the method
of dealing with inebriated drivers, it remains to be seen whether
it will effectively deal with the drunk driving problem. In this regard, Municipal Court Judge Leon Emerson stated that the new
law is "the worst piece of drafting I've seen in a long time."13 Additionally, few judges, prosecutors, or defense attorneys can agree
on the exact interpretation of the wording of the new legislation,
and it appears that the laws will have to be either legislatively
amended or judicially interpreted.' 4 The new law may also be
6. L.A. Daily J., Nov. 24, 1981, § 1, at 4, col. 2.
7. Act of Sept. 29, 1981, ch. 940, §§ 1-50, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3437-459
(West) (to be codified in scattered sections of the California Penal and Vehicle
Codes).
8. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 15, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.

9. Id. at 4, col. 1. Tomlinson, None for the Road, AuTO CLUB NEWS, Dec. 1981,
at 3.
10. Drexler, California'sNew Drunk Driving Laws, L.A. LAWYER, Mar. 1982, at
34. See also infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 58-118 and accompanying text.
13. L.A. Daily J., Nov. 24, 1981, § 1, at 4, col. 2.
14. Id. Evidently the California legislature has realized that AB 541 does have

Drunk Driving Law

[Vol. 10: 91, 19821

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

vulnerable to attacks based on constitutional grounds. There are
persuasive arguments that the California drunk driving law violates the constitutional presumption of innocence, deprives the
accused of his right to due process, and violates the constitutional
prohibition of bills of attainder, the right to a fair jury trial, and
the separation of powers doctrine. Moreover, the crime of driving
when one's blood-alcohol content is .10 or higher may be found to
be an invalid strict liability statute. Finally, while the new laws
may reduce the incidence of alcohol-related accidents in the short
run, it is likely that these reductions will be only temporary.
II. THE NEW LAW
The new California drunk driving law creates significant
changes in three important areas relating to drunk driving. First,
a number of changes have occurred in the substantive law itself.
Second, the new law marks a significant attempt to curtail the
controversial practice of plea bargaining. Third, the new law significantly increases both the certainty and severity of the penalties to be assessed against a person who is convicted of driving
while intoxicated.
A.

Changes in the Substantive Law

Most of the substantive provisions of the new drunk driving law
are contained in sections 2315215 ("misdemeanor drunk driving")
its shortcomings and has enacted urgency legislation to "clean-up" ambiguities in
the new law. See Act of Sept. 29, 1981, ch. 940, §§ 1-50, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3437459 (West) (to be codified at scattered sections of the California Penal and Vehicle
Codes). These amendments, however, may not remedy all of the shortcomings of
the new law. See infra notes 146-196 and accompanying text.
15. Section 23152 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage or any drug, or under the combined influence of an alcoholic
beverage and any drug, to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.10 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West) (amending Act
of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis Serv. 277 (West) (amending CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23152 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codifed at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152).
Section 23152 amended and renumbered § 23102 of the Vehicle Code. Section
23102 provided in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, or under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any
drug, to drive a vehicle upon any highway.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating

and 2315316 ("felony drunk driving") of the California Vehicle
Code. A felony violation requires that the driver "proximately
causes death or bodily injury to any person other than the
17
driver."
Except for the felony/misdemeanor distinction between sections 23152 and 23153, subsections (a) and (b) of the two sections
are virtually identical. Subsection (a) ("driving under the influence") of sections 23152 and 23153 makes it unlawful to drive
under the influence of alcohol or drugs or their combined influence, while subsection (b) (".10 driving") of these two sections
makes it a crime to drive a vehicle with .10 percent or more of alcohol in one's blood.
liquor, or under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any
drug, to drive a vehicle upon other than a highway.
The department shall not be required to provide patrol or enforce the provisions of this subdivision.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1981), amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53,
§ 26, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 277 (West) amended by Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1337,
§ 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152).
16. Section 23153 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage or any drug, or under the combined influence of an alcoholic
beverage and any drug, to drive a vehicle and, when so driving, do any act
forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in the driving of the
vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes death or bodily injury to
any person other than the driver.
(b) It is unlawful for any person, while having 0.10 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle and, when so driving, do any act forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in the
driving of the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes death or
bodily injury to any person other than the driver.
Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West) (amending Act
of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis Serv. 277 (West) (amending CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23153 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153).
Section 23153 amended and renumbered § 23101 of the Vehicle Code. Section
23101 provided in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, or under the combined nfluence of intoxicating liquor and any
drug, to drive a vehicle upon a highway and, when so driving, do any act
forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in the driving of
such vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes death or bodily injury to any person other than himself.
(b) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, or under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any
drug, to drive a vehicle other than on a highway and, when so driving, do
any act, or neglect any duty imposed by law, which act or neglect proximately causes death or bodily injury to any person other than himself.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23101 (West Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18,
1982, ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 277 (West) amended by Act of Sept.
24, 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West) (to be codified at
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153).
17. Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West) (amending Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis Serv. 277 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codifed at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23153).
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The "driving under the influence" subsections differ only
slightly from the two subsections they amend. The new subsections differ from the old only in that the new subsections substitute the words "alcoholic beverage" for the words "intoxicating
liquor." 18 The apparent purpose underlying this change in terminology is to preclude the argument that beer, wine, or any other
intoxicant is not an intoxicating liquor. 19
The major substantive change in the drunk driving law occurs
in subsection (b) of sections 23152 and 23153. Under the old
drunk driving law it was unlawful to drive under the influence of
an intoxicating liquor or under the combined influence of an intoxicating liquor and any drug.20 Under the new law, however, it
is a crime to drive while having .10 percent or more alcohol in
one's blood.21 The very wording of subsection (b) of sections
23152 and 23153 has created the evidentiary problem known as
"back-calculating" a defendant's blood-alcohol level. The problem
arises because it is impossible to accurately determine a person's
blood-alcohol level at the time he was first stopped when chemi22
cal tests are later taken at the police station or a medical center.
One solution to this problem would be to charge the defendant
with "driving under the influence" as well as with ".10 driving."23
18. The phrase "alcoholic beverage" is defined in § 23151. Section 23151 provides in pertinent part:
'Alcoholic beverage' includes any liquid or solid material intended to be
ingested by a person which contains ethanol, also known as ethyl alcohol,
or alcohol, including, but not limited to, alcoholic beverages as defined in
Section 23004 of the Business and Professions Code, intoxicating liquor,
malt beverage, beer, wine, spirits, liqueur, whiskey, rum, vodka, cordials,
gin, and brandy, and any mixture containing one or more alcoholic beverages. Alcoholic beverage includes a mixture of one or more alcoholic beverages whether found or ingested separately or as a mixture.
Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 25, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 276 (West) (amending CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23151 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL VEH. CODE § 23151)).
19. Taylor, Advising Clients Under California'sNew Drunk Driving Law, CAL.
LAw., Apr. 1982, at 37.
20. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23101, 23102 (West Supp. 1981), as amended by Act of
Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 26, 27, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 277 (West) (to be codified at
CAL. VEH. CODE. §§ 23152, 12153).
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West)
(amending Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis Serv. 277 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codifed at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23152).
22. L.A. Daily J., Feb. 22, 1982, § 1, at 2, col. 3. Concerned about the difficulty
posed by back-calculating, Los Angeles City Attorney Ira Reiner announced that
his office would not prosecute under § 23152(b). See Taylor, supra note 19, at 37.
23. Pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE § 954 (West 1970), a defendant may be
charged with violating both subsections (a) and (b) of either § 23152 or § 23153.

This procedure would allow a prosecutor to obtain a conviction
for "driving under the influence" of alcohol in the event that the
jury determines that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was not
.10 or more at the time he was actually driving.
Recently, the California legislature enacted its own solution to
the "back-calculating" problem. Senate Bill 74524 has amended
sections 23152 and 23153 establishing a "three hour presumption."
This new legislation provides that where a chemical test taken
within three hours after the defendant was driving shows that the
person's blood-alcohol level was .10 or more at the time the test
was taken, a rebuttable presumption arises establishing that the
person's blood-alcohol level was .10 or more at the time he was
driving. The result of the "three hour presumption" is that a defendant may be convicted of ".10 driving" based on his bloodalcohol level three hours after he was driving a vehicle.
AB 541 posed one additional substantive change in the old
drunk driving law. Under the old law, a defendant was presumed
to be "driving under the influence" where he had a blood-alcohol
level of .10 or above. 25 This presumption, however, was subject to
rebuttal by "the introduction of any other competent evidence
bearing upon the question whether the person was under the in26
fluence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged offense."
'27
The repeal of the ".10
AB 541 repealed the ".10 presumption.
Pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1982), however, a defendant may be
punished for violation of only one of the two subsections even if he pleads guilty
to or is convicted of both offenses. It would make no difference whether the defendant was punished for violation of subsection (a) or (b) since the penalties for
violation of the subsections are the same. See infra notes 64, 98 and accompanying
text.
24. Subsection (b) of sections 23152 and 23153 as amended by Senate Bill 745
provides in pertinent part:
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption
that the person had .10 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his 6r her
blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had .10 percent or
more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours after driving.
Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7138 (West) (amending Act
of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis Serv. 277 (West) (amending CAL. VEH.
CODE §§ 23152(b), 23153(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codifed at CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23152(b), 23153(b)).
25. Former § 23126 provided in pertinent part: "if there was ... 0.10 percent
or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the
person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged offense." CAL. VEH. CODE § 23126 (West 1971), as amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982,
ch. 53, § 28, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 277-78 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23155).
26. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23126 (West 1971), as amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982,
ch. 53, § 28, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 277-78 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23155).
27. See Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 35, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West)
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presumption" was short-lived, however, since urgency "clean-up"
legislation reestablished the presumption as it existed prior to
January 1, 1982.28
As a result of this "clean-up" legislation, a prosecutor may proceed under one of two theories in prosecuting a drunk driving
case. First, he may charge a defendant with violating subsection
(a) of sections 23152 or 23153. Should a prosecutor so choose, he
may introduce evidence showing that at the time a blood, breath,
or urine test was administered, the defendant's blood-alcohol content was .10 or greater. 29 This would create a presumption that
30
the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.
This presumption would be subject to rebuttal by "introduction of
any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether
the person ingested any alcoholic beverage or was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged offense." 31 Second, a prosecutor may elect to charge the defendant
with the new crime of ".10 driving." Since these subsections
32
make it a crime to drive with a blood-alcohol level of .10 or more,
introduction of evidence that the defendant had a blood-alcohol
level of .10 or more at the time he was driving will compel a jury
(amending CAL.
§ 23180).

VEH. CODE

§ 23180 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.

VEH.

CODE

28. New section 23155 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Upon the trial of any criminal action, or preliminary proceeding in a
criminal action, arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any
person while driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 23152 or subdivision (a)
of Section 23153, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time of
the test as shown by chemical analysis of that person's blood, breath, or
urine shall give rise to the following presumptions affecting the burden of

proof:

(3) If there was at that time 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in

the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged offense.

(c) This section shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any
other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether the person
ingested an alcoholic beverage or was under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage at the time of the alleged offense.
Act of Feb. 18, 1982, Ch. 53, § 27, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 274 (West) (amending CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23155(a), (a) (3), and (c) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.

§23155(a), (a)(3), and (c)).
29. See supra note 28.
30. Id.

VEH. CODE

31. Id.
32. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

to find the defendant guilty. Evidence showing that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was .10 or more within three hours after
the defendant was driving will create a rebuttable presumption
that the defendant is guilty of ".10 driving."
At this point one can see the impact that the new crime of ".10
driving" will have in the handling of drunk driving cases. Subsection (b) of sections 23152 and 23153 affords the prosecutor the luxury of obtaining a conviction for ".10 driving" while depriving the
defendant of the opportunity of introducing evidence to show that
he was not driving under the influence. In short, the defendant is
left with only three defenses to a charge of ".10 driving." He may
argue that he was not driving, that the test device gave an inaccurate reading,33 or where the "three hour presumption" is in operation, the defendant may introduce evidence to rebut the
presumption.
Perhaps the repeal of the ".10 presumption" in the original version of the drunk driving legislation is explained by the fact that
the crime of ".10 driving" eliminates any need for a prosecutor to
proceed under a "driving under the influence" theory. However,
the seemingly unnecessary reenactment of the ".10 presumption"
is not without explanation. The crime of ".10 driving" may not
withstand the inevitable constitutional attacks which will ensue
against it.34 If the subsections pertaining to ".10 driving" were
found to be unconstitutional, and the ".10 presumption" was not a
part of the law, prosecutors would then be forced to charge the
defendant with "driving under the influence" without the benefit
of the ".10 presumption" existing under the old law. If this were
to occur, it would be much more difficult to obtain a conviction
under the new law than it was under the old law. In short, by restoring the ".10 presumption," the legislature has created a "backup" in the event that the new crime of ".10 driving" is found to be
unconstitutional.
B. The New Plea BargainingProvisions
Perhaps one of the most controversial methods of dealing with
drunk drivers is to allow them to plead "guilty" to a lesser charge
of reckless driving instead of a charge of "driving under the influence." California, like many other states, has freely allowed motorists charged with "driving under the influence" to plead
"guilty" to the less serious offense. As an illustration of how
widespread the plea bargaining practice has been, in 1978, 80,000
drivers in California pleaded "guilty" to reckless driving while
33. See Drexler, supra note 10, at 42.
34. See infra notes 146-196 and accompanying text.
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only 5,000 drivers were charged with this offense. 35 This practice
has been heavily criticized, and a number of commentators have
argued that the problems caused by drunk drivers are not the result of inadequate laws, but are instead caused by wholesale plea
36
bargaining practices.
The apparent willingness of such a large number of people to
plead "guilty" to a charge of reckless driving is readily understood
when the possible consequences arising from a conviction of
"driving under the influence" are considered. The old drunk driving law provided for increased penalties for a second or third conviction of "driving under the influence" in certain
circumstances.3 7 However, these multiple-offense sanctions could
35. See Starr, The War Against Drunk Drivers, Newsweek, Sept 13, 1982 at 35.
36. Id.; CBS News, 60 Minutes, (1982) (broadcast over the CBS Television Network January 3, 1982); L.A. Daily J., Mar. 11, 1981, at 5, col. 2.
37. The previous version of section 23101, which dealt with felony "driving
under the influence," provided in pertinent part:
(c) Any person convicted under this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in the county jail for not less than 90 days
nor more than one year, and by a fine of not less than three hundred fiftyfive dollars ($355) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
(d) If any person is convicted under this section of an offense which occurred within five years of the date of a prior offense which resulted in a
conviction of a violation of [misdemeanor drunk driving] and is granted
probation, it shall be a condition of probation that such person be confined
in jail for at least 5 days but not more than one year and pay a fine of at
least three hundred fifty-five dollars ($355) but not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
CA. VEH. CODE § 23101 (West Supp. 1981), as amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch.
53, §§ 35-39, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280-82 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23180, 23181, 23185, 23186, 23191).
The previous version of section 23102 which dealt with misdemeanor "driving
under the influence" provided in pertinent part:
(c) Any person convicted under this section shall be punished upon a first
conviction by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 48 hours
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than three hundred fiftyfive dollars ($355) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by both
such fine and imprisonment. If, however, any person so convicted consents to, and does participate in and successfully completes, a driver improvement program or treatment program for persons who are habitual
users of alcohol, or both such programs, as designated by the court, the
court shall punish such person by a fine of not less than two hundred fiftyfive dollars ($255) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 48 hours nor more than six
.months or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(d) Any person convicted under this section of an offense which occurred
within five years of the date of a prior offense which resulted in a conviction of an offense under this section... shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 48 hours nor more than one year
and by a fine of not less than three hundred fifty-five dollars ($355) nor
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). Any person convicted under this

be avoided where the defendant pleaded "guilty" to a charge of
reckless driving 38 instead of a charge of "driving under the influence." This was possible since a conviction for reckless driving
did not constitute a prior conviction for purposes of increased sec39
ond-offense sanctions.
. While the new drunk driving legislation does not preclude a
prosecutor from reducing a "driving under the influence" charge
to one of reckless driving,40 it does mark a significant legislative
attempt to curtail the liberal practice of plea bargaining in drunk
section of an offense which occurred within five years of the date of a prior
offense which resulted in a conviction [of felony driving under the influence]... shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less
than five days nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than three
hundred fifty-five dollars ($355) nor more than one thousand dollars
($1,000).
(e) If any person is convicted under this section of an offense which occurred within five years of the date of a prior offense which resulted in a
conviction under this section... and is granted probation, it shall be a
condition of probation that such person be confined in jail for at least 48
hours but not more than one year and pay a fine of at least three hundred
fifty-five dollars ($355) but not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). If
any person is convicted under this section of an offense which occurred
within five years of the date of a prior offense which resulted in a conviction [of felony driving under the influence]... and is granted probation, it
shall be a condition of probation that such person be confined in jail for
not less than five days nor more than one year and pay a fine of not less
than three hundred fifty-five dollars ($355) nor more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000).
CAL.VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1981), as amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch.
53, §§ 29-34, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278-80 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23160, 23161, 23165, 23166, 23170, 23171).
38. The offense of reckless driving is contained in § 23103 of the Vehicle Code
and was not changed by the new law. Section 23103 provides in pertinent part: "A
person who drives any vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving... ." CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23103 (West Supp. 1982).
39. Neither former section 23101 nor section 23102 provided for increased sanctions for a prior conviction of reckless driving. See infra notes 65-104. Moreover,
under the old law the prosecution was not required to specify whether or not the
reckless driving conviction was alcohol related. Since the reckless driving conviction may or may not have been alcohol related it could not be used for purposes of
second-offense sanctions.
40. While plea bargaining is not prevented by the new legislation, new section
23212 does set forth certain requirements which must be met when a charge of
reckless driving is substituted for a charge of violation of § 23152. If the court allows such a substitution, it must specify on the record its reasons for the order,
whether the substitution was requested by the prosecution, and whether the prosecution concurred in or opposed the substitution. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23212
(West Supp. 1982).
Additionally, section 23212 requires that where the prosecution makes a motion
for such a substitution, the prosecution must submit a written statement which
gives reasons for the motion. This statement becomes part of the court record.
Reasons in support of a motion may include problems of proof, why another offense is more properly charged, and "the interests of justice." Where the reasons
include the "interests of justice," the statement must specify all of the factors
which contributed to this conclusion. Id.
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driving cases. The new law accomplishes this by limiting
prosecutorial and judicial discretion to plea bargain. 41 New section 23105.542 provides that where a prosecutor accepts a plea of
"guilty" or "nolo contendere" in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of section 23152 or "misdemeanor drunk driving," the prosecutor must indicate on the record whether the offense included consumption of an alcoholic
beverage by the defendant and must also set forth any facts
showing the consumption of an alcoholic beverage.
Section 23105.5 also provides that, under certain circumstances,
the conviction for reckless driving will constitute a prior conviction for second-offense sanctions. 43 Reading the new drunk driving law strictly, a reckless driving conviction qualifies as a prior
conviction for purposes of second-offense sanctions only when the
conviction resulted from a complaint alleging a violation of section 23152 and the current complaint alleges a violation of the
41. Drexler, supra note 10, at 34.
42. New section 23103.5 provides in pertinent part:
(a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to
a charge of a violation of Section 23103 in satisfation of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of Section 23152, the prosecution
shall state for the record a factual basis for the satisfaction or substitution,
including whether or not there had been consumption of any alcoholic
beverage or ingestion or administration of any drug, or both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. The statement shall set forth the
facts which show whether or not there was a consumption of any alcoholic
beverge or the ingestion or administration of any drug by the defendant in
connection with the offense.
Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 24, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 276 (West) (emphasis added)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103.5 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.

§ 23103.5).
43. Section 23105.5 provides in pertinent part:

VEH. CODE

If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a
charge of a violation of Section 23103 and the prosecutor's statement
under subdivision (a) states that there was consumption of any alcoholic
beverage or the ingestion or administration of any drugs by the defendant
in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for the purposes of Section 23165 or 23200, as specified in those
sections.
Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 24, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 276 (West) (amending CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23103.5(c) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL VEH. CODE
§ 23103.5(c)). Section 23165 provides the penalties for a person convicted of misdemeanor drunk driving where the person has been convicted of felony or misdemeanor drunk driving or "alcohol-related reckless driving" within the past five
years. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. Section 23200 limits the
court's power to strike prior convictions for felony or misdemeanor drunk driving
or alcohol-related reckless driving. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.

same section. 44 The reckless driving conviction may not be used
as a prior conviction for purposes of third offense sanctions provided for by the new law. 45 Additionally, for the reckless driving
conviction to constitute a prior offense for purposes of a subsequent conviction of "misdemeanor drunk driving," the reckless
driving offense must have occurred within five years from the
date of the "misdemeanor drunk driving" offense and on or after
January 1, 1982.46
The new drunk driving legislation also limits the exercise of judicial discretion by preventing a court from striking prior convictions to avoid the harshness imposed by the new sentencing
provisions for multiple offenders. Under the old law, a court
could, in the interest of justice, strike a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing in order to avoid imposing the minimum confinement time and fine provisions. 47 The new law expressly
44. Drexler, supra note 10, at 34. A reduction from a charge of "felony drunk
driving," to reckless driving does not qualify for second offense sanctions since
section 23103.5 clearly provides that a priorable conviction may result only from a
reduction of a misdemeanor drunk driving allegation to reckless driving. See
supra note 42. Moreover, a reckless driving conviction is not priorable for purposes of a subsequent felony conviction since section 23103.5 provides that the
reckless driving conviction constitutes a prior offense only for purposes of sections
23165 and 23200. See supra note 43. Section 23165 provides punishment where the
second conviction is for misdemeanor drunk driving. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. Section 23200 limits the court's discretion in striking prior convictions. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note that the original version of the new drunk driving law
provided that a reduction from either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving to
reckless driving, constituted a prior conviction for purposes of a subsequent conviction of either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving. See Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch.
53, §§ 36, 38, 1982 Cal. Legis Serv. 280, 281 (West) (to be codified at CAL VEH. CODE
§§ 23181, 23186). These provisions were superceded by Chapter 941 of the California Statutes.
45. Sections 23170 and 23171 provide penalties for conviction of "misdemeanor
drunk driving" where the offense occurred within five years of two or more prior
offenses which resulted in convictions of felony or misdemeanor drunk driving, or
both. See Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 34-35, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23170, 23171 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23170, 23171). Sections 23170 and 23171 will be discussed more
fully infra at notes 86-91.
The original version of the drunk driving law provided that a reduction from
either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving to reckless driving constituted a prior
conviction for third-offense sanctions for conviction under § 23152 or § 23153 when
the offenses occurred within five years of each other. See Act of Sept. 29, 1981, ch.
940, §§ 37, 39, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3455-3456 (West) These provisions were
superceded by chapter 941 of the California Statutes. See Act of Sept. 29, 1981, ch.
941 §§ 1-14, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3459-468 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23102, 23105, 23165, 23200 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23102, 23102.5, 23103.5, 23105, 23165, 23195, 23200, 23212)).
46. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 31, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23165 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23165).
47. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23101, 23102 (West Supp. 1981) amended by Act of
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prohibits this practice. New section 23200 prohibits a court from
striking prior convictions for "misdemeanor drunk driving," "felony drunk driving," or "alcohol-related reckless driving" for purposes of sentencing in order to avoid imposing, as part of the
sentence or term of probation, the minimum time of imprisonment and the minimum fine provided by the new law.4 8

The new law also restricts a judge's ability to utilize diversionary sentencing by denying his power to stay proceedings or dismiss a charge of drunk driving pending the defendant's
participation in an alcohol treatment program. New section 23202
specifically prohibits a judge from staying proceedings or dismissing such a charge under these circumstances.4 9 Participation
in an alcohol treatment program may, however, be a condition in
50
a grant of probation.
In order to facilitate enforcement of the multiple violation provisions, new section 23200 requires that when the defendant is
charged with a violation of either felony or misdemeanor drunk
driving, the court must obtain a copy of the defendant's driving
record to determine whether the defendant has committed offenses which resulted in conviction of "misdemeanor drunk driving," "felony drunk driving," or "alcohol-related reckless
driving."51 When the driving record indicates that such prior offenses have occurred within five years of the charged offense, the
Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 26-27, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 277, (West) (to be codifled at
CAL. VEH. CODE§§ 23152, 23153).
48. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 40, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 282 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23200(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAl. VEH.
CODE § 23200(a)).
49. Section 23202 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any case in which a person is charged with a violation of Section
23152 or 23153, prior to acquittal or conviction, the court shall not suspend
or stay the proceedings for the purpose of allowing the accused person to
attend or participate, nor shall the court consider dismissal of or entertain
a motion to dismiss the proceedings because the accused person attends
or participates during that suspension, in any driver improvement program, a treatment program for persons who are habitual users of alcohol
or other alcoholism program....
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23202(a) (West Supp. 1982).
50. Section 23202 provides in pertinent part: 'This section shall not apply to
any attendance or participation in any driver improvement or treatment programs
after conviction and sentencing, including attendance or participation in any of
those programs as a condition of probation granted after conviction when permitted pursuant to this article." CAL. VEH. CODE § 23202(b) (West Supp. 1982).
51. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 40, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 282 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23200(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23200(b)).

court is: required to notify and inform each court where any of the
prior convictions occurred of the current proceedings.5 2 The reason for this notification is that if the defendant has been placed
on probation for a prior drunk driving conviction, and he has violated a term of the probation by subsequently driving while
"under the influence" of alcohol, the probation and suspension of
53
his sentence must be~revoked.
C. The New Penalty Provmmons
Perhaps the most widely publicized aspects of the new drunk
driving law are the penalty provisions designed to remove drunk
drivers from Callfornia's,highways. This publicity, however, has
created false impressions as to the actual severity of the new law
in two areas. First, m describing the new law the media has
coined the phrase "drink, drive, go to prison."54 This is simply not
an accurate portrayal of the new drunk driving law; there is no
"automatic" jail sentence for first time offenders. 55 Second, media
reports have created the general impression that the consequences of an "alcohol-related reckless driving" conviction and a
"misdemeanor drunk driving" conviction are virtually identical.
In reality, however an "alcohol-related reckless driving" conviction is substantially less serious than a "misdemeanor drunk driving" conviction. 5 6 Appendix A summarizes the differing
consequences.
When examining the new penalty provisions relating to drunk
driving, it is'helpful to distinguish between misdemeanor and felony convictions. These two categories can further be broken
down to penalties for the first conviction, penalties for two convictions for offenses occuring within five years of each other, and
penalties for conviction 'of three or more offenses committed
within five years. Minimum' jail sen-cences and fines are
57
mandatory under the new law.

52. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, Ch. 53, § 40, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 282 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23200(c) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23200)).
53. CA.L..VEH. CODE § 23207 (West Supp. 1982).
54. Drexler,,supra note 10, at 34.

55. -See,mfra notes 65-72. Dzrng the initial months in which the new drunk
driving law was in effect, 61% of the first time offenders avoided jail sentences.
L.A. Times, Sept. 23?. 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
56. Memorandum from Annefte Keller, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney, to
Hill Street Deputies' (Npvember 4, 1981). (discussing limited prlorability of 23103
convictions under the new legislation).
57. CAL.VEH. CODE § 23206(e) (West Supp. 1982).
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1. Misdemeanor Provisions
Penalties for "misdemeanor drunk driving" are found in sections 23160,58 23161,59 23165,60 23166,61 23170,62 and 23171.63 Appendix B summarizes these penalties. First offense penalties are
found in sections 23160 and 23161. Second offenses occurring
within five years of the first offense are punished pursuant to sections 23165 and 23166. Penalties for three or more offenses occurring within five years of each other are found in sections 23170
and 23171. Sections 23160, 23165, and 23170 provide the minimum
and maximum punishments for a conviction, while sections 23161,
23166, and 23171 contain conditions which must accompany a
grant of probation. Additionally, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of misdemeanor "driving under the influence" or misdemeanor ".10 driving," he is subject to the same
64
punishment.
a.) Penaltiesfor Initial Misdemeanor Offense. When a person
is convicted of his first violation of "misdemeanor.drunk driving,"
the court has two sentencing options. The court may choose to
sentence the defendant to imprisonment in the county jail for not
less than ninety-six hours nor more than six months, and impose
a fine of not less than $375 nor more than $500.65 Finally, the de58. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 29, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278 (West) (amendCODE § 23160 (West Supp. 1982) (to.be codifledat CAL. VEH. CODE

ing CAL. VEH.
§ 23160)).

59. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 30, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278-79 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23161 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23161)).
60. Act of Feb. 18, 1982,.ch. 53, § 31, 1982 Cal.Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23165 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23165)).
61. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) .(amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166 (West Supp. 1902) (to -be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23166)).
62. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 33, 1982. Cal. Legis. Serv. 279-80 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23170 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL VEH.
CODE § 23170)).
63. Act of Feb. 18, 1982,-ch. 53, § 34, 1982 Cal. Legs. Serv. 280 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23171 (West Supp, 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. 'CODE
§ 23171)).
64. The operative provision relating -to punishment 4for violation of section
23152 makes no distinction between a violation of either subsection (a) or (b) of
section 23152. See Act of Feb. 18, 1982; ch. 53, §§ 29r34, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278-80
(West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23160; 23161, 23165, 23166, 23170, 23171 (West
Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23160, 23161, 23165, 23166, 23170,
23171)).
65. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 29,. 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. '278 (West) (amend-

fendant's drivers license is suspended for six months. 6 6 If the
court elects to sentence the defendant to prison, it may provide
that the imprisonment is not to occur during regular work days of
67
the defendant.
Alternatively, the court may elect to grant probation to the defendant. The terms of probation must be for a term of at least
three years.6 8 The grant of probation must also include one of the
following:
1.) Confinement in the county jail for at least forty-eight hours
but not more than six months and a fine of at least $375 but not
more than $500.69 The court may also order the Department of
Motor Vehicles to suspend the defendant's drivers license for six
months. 70
2.) A fine of $375 but not more than $500 and a license restriction for ninety days precluding the person from driving other than
to or from work, or within the scope of the person's employment
if driving is necessary to perform work duties, or to and from approved treatment programs. 71 If probation is granted, participation in a driver improvement program or an alcohol treatment
program is required when the conviction occurs in a county
where such a program has been certified by the county alcohol
program administrator and approved by the board of
ing CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23160(a)).
Under the old law, a conviction for an initial offense of misdemeanor "driving
under the influence," a person could be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not less than forty-eight hours, not more than six months, or by a fine of
not less than $355, not more than $500 or both. However, if the defendant participated in an alcohol treatment program or a driver improvement program, or both,
as designated by the court, he would be punished by a fine of not less than $255

nor more than $500, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than fortyeight hours nor more than six months, or both. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West
Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 29, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278
(West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160)).
66. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 29, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160(c) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE

§ 23160(c)).
67. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 29, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23160(b)).
The old law contained a similar provision. See CAL. VER. CODE § 23102 (West
Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 29, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278
(West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160).

68. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23206(b) (West Supp. 1982).
69. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 30, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278-79 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23161(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23161(a)).
70. Id.; CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (1) (West Supp. 1982).

71. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 30, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278-79 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23161(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23161(a)).
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supervisors.
In summary, the penalties for an initial conviction of "misdemeanor drunk driving," do not provide for an automatic or
mandatory jail sentence. Pursuant to section 23161, the defendant
may be granted probation accompanied by a fine, license restriction, and perhaps participation in a driver improvement program
and/or an alcohol treatment program.
b.) Penaltiesfor Two Offenses Within Five Years. The severity
of the new drunk driving law is illustrated by the sections providing penalties for two or more offenses occurring within five years.
The new law not only provides stronger penalties in this area, but
also provides that an "alcohol- related reckless driving" conviction
constitutes a prior offense for purposes of sentence enhancement
where the driver is subsequently convicted for "misdemeanor
drunk driving."73 As a result of the legislature's creation of this
new offense, the likelihood of a person falling into the second offense category is significantly enhanced.
New section 23165 provides that where a person is convicted of
"misdemeanor drunk driving" and the offense occurred within
five years of an offense that resulted in a conviction of a felony or
misdemeanor drunk driving charge, or an "alcohol-related reckless driving" charge, the person must serve ninety days in the
county jail and pay a fine of at least $375. The maximum punishment for such a conviction is one year in the county jail and a fine
of $1,000. 74 Additionally, this person's license will be suspended
for one year 75 unless he consents to an alcohol treatment program
72. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 30, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 278-79 (West)

(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23161(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23161(b)).
73. See supra notes 42-46.
74. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 31, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23165 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23165)). Under the old law, two convictions for misdemeanor "driving under the
influence" for offenses which occurred within five years of each other resulted in
punishment by imprisonment in the county jail for a minimum of forty-eight hours
but not more than one year and by a fine of at least $355 but not more than $1,000.
On the other hand, if the prior offense resulted in a conviction for felony "driving
under the influence" the person would be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail for not less than five days nor more than one year and by a fine of not
less than $355 nor more than $1,000. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1981)
amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 31, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (to
be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23165).
75. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 270-71 (West)

for a minimum of one year.76
The court, however, may elect to grant probation. The probationary period must be for a minimum of three years, 77 and the
terms and conditions of the probation must include:
1.) Confinement in the county jail for at least ten days but not
more than one year, a fine of at least $375 but not more than
$1,000,78 and license suspension for one year unless this person

consents to participation in an alcohol treatment program for at
least one year,79 or
2.) Each of the following: a.) confinement in the county jail for
at least forty-eight hours but not more than one year;8O b.) a fine
of at least $375 but not more than $1,000;81 c.) license restriction
for one year allowing travel to and from an alcohol treatment program and within the scope of employment where driving is necessary to the duties of the person's employment. 82 d.) participation
for at least one year in an alcoholic treatment program as provided in sections 11837-11838.2 of the Health and Safety Code.83
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (3) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (3)).
76. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 17, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 271 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352.5(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 13352.5(a)).
77. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23206(b) (West Supp. 1982).
78. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE

§ 23166(a)).
79. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 17, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 271 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 13352(a)).
80. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166(b) (1) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23166(b)(1)). The old law provided an identical condition where the prior offense resulted in a conviction of misdemeanor "driving under the influence." See
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53,
§ 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166)).
Where the prior offense resulted in a conviction of felony "driving under the influence," probation was conditioned on a minimum sentence of five days but not
more than one year. Id.
81. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166(b) (2) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23166(b) (2)). Under the old law, where the prior offense resulted in a conviction
of either felony or misdemeanor "driving under the influence," probation was conditioned upon payment of a fine of at least $355 but not more than $1,000. See CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32,
1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102)).
82. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166(b) (3) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23166(b) (3)).
83. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 32, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23166(b) (4) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23166(b)(4)). The alcohol treatment program requires that the participant engage in face-to-face interviews regarding the person's progress every two weeks.
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The court may remove the license restriction when the person
has successfully participated in the alcohol treatment program for
84
six months.
c.) Penaltiesfor Three or More Offenses Within Five Years. Convictions for three or more offenses within five years will subject
the defendant to an extremely harsh sentence. For this reason, a
prior "alcohol-related reckless driving" conviction does not constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the three or more convic8
tions category. 5
Where a person is convicted of "misdemeanor drunk driving,"
and the offense occurred within five years of two or more offenses
resulting in convictions of either felony or misdemeanor drunk
driving, the person is subject to imprisonment for not less than
120 days nor more than one year, and to a fine of not less than
$375 nor more than $1,000.86 Additionally, the person's license
must be revoked for three years.87 This punishment follows
whether or not the court grants probation.8 8 If the court does
grant probation it must be for a term of three years. 89 When the
defendant has not successfully completed the alcohol treatment
program which may be required for two-time offenders, 90 the
court must require, as a condition of probation, participation in
this program for a period of at least one year.9 '
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11837.4(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982). Other activities
may include lectures, classes, group discussions, and individual counseling. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11837.4(a)(3) (West Supp. 1982). Where a person has
previously participated in this program he may not be readmitted until four years
after he ceased his prior participation in the program. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53,
§ 4, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 263 (West) (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11837.3 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at C-,L. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11837.3).
84. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23168 (West Supp. 1982).
85. Keller, supra note 56, at 2. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
86. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 33, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279, 280 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23170 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23170).
87. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 33, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 279, 280 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23170 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEI.
CODE § 23170).
88. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 34, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23171(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL VEH. CODE
§ 23171(a)).
89. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23206(b) (West Supp. 1982).
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 34, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23171(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23171(b)).

2.

Felony Provisions

Penalties for felony "driving under the influence" are found in
sections 23180,92 23181,93 23185,94 23186,95 23190,96 and 23191.97 A
chart summarizing these penalties can be found in Appendix C.
First offense penalties are found in sections 23180 and 23181. Second offenses occurring within five years of the first offense are
punished pursuant to sections 23185 and 23186. Penalties for offenses occurring within five years of two or more prior offenses
are provided in sections 23190 and 23191. Sections 23180, 23185, and
23190 provide the minimum and maximum punishment for a conviction, while sections 23181, 23186, and 23191 contain conditions
which must accompany a grant of probation. Additionally, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of felony "driving
under the influence" or felony ".10 driving," he is subject to the
98
same punishment.
a.) Penaltiesfor Initial Felony Offense. A person convicted for
violation of felony "driving under the influence" must be fined a
minimum of $375 but not more than $1,00099 and have his license
suspended for one year'0 0 regardless of whether probation is
granted. If the court does not grant probation, this person is pun92. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 35, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23180 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23180).
93. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 36, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280-81 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23181 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23181).
94. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 37, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23185 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23185).
95. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 38, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23186 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23186).
96. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23190 (West Supp. 1982).
97. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 39, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281-82 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23191 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23191).
98. The operative provisions relating to punishment for felony drunk driving
make no distinction between the crime of .10 driving or driving under the influence. See Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 35, 37, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280-81 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23180, 23185 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23180, 23185).
99. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 35, 36, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280-81 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23180, 23181 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23180, 23181). Under the old law, a person convicted of violation
of felony "driving under the influence" was fined a minimum of $355 but not more
than $5,000. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23101 (West Supp. 1981) amended by Act of
Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 26, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE

§ 23180).

100. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 35, 36, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280-81 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23180, 23181 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23180, 23181) and Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal.
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ished for a minimum of ninety days but not more than one year in
the state prison or the county jail.' 0 ' If the court grants probation, it must be for a minimum of three yearsO2 and be conditioned upon imprisonment in the county jail for a minimum of
03
five days but not more than one year.
b.) Penaltiesfor Two Offenses Within Five Years. When a person is convicted of "felony drunk driving" and the offense occurred within five years of a previous conviction for either felony
or misdemeanor drunk driving, he will receive substantial punishment. If the court does not grant probation, he will be imprisoned
in either the state prison or county jail for a minimum of 120 days
but not more than one year, 0 4 fined a minimum of $375 but not
more than $5,000,105 and have his license suspended for three
years.106
Legis. Serv. 270-71 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (2) (West Supp.
1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (2)).
101. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 35, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23180 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23180).
102. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23206(b) (West Supp. 1982).
103. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 36, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280-81 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23181 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE

§ 23181).

104. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 37, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23185 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23185). Under the old law, where a person was convicted of violating § 23153 and
that offense occurred within five years of an offense which resulted in a conviction
of either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving, the court was required to sentence
him to imprisonment for a minimum of 90 days. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23101 (West
Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 26, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281
(West). (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 23185). The judge could, however,
strike the prior conviction to avoid imposing this sentence. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
105. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 37, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23185 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23185). Under the old law this person was required to pay a minimum fine of
$355. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23101 (West Supp. 1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18,
1982, ch. 53, § 26, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (to be codified at CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23152). The judge, however, could strike the prior conviction to avoid imposing this fine. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
106. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 37, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23185 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23185). Under the old law, this person's license would be suspended for a minimum of one year. Two convictions for felony "driving under the influence" for offenses occurring within three years of each other would result in license
revocation for a minimum of five years. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352 (West Supp.
1981) amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 270 (West)
(to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352).

The court, however, may grant probation for a period of at least
three years. 07 If this occurs, the court must condition the grant
of probation upon either:
1.) Confinement in the county jail for at least 120 days, a fine of
at least $375 but not more than $5,000, and license suspension for
three years,108 or
2.) Each of the following 0 9 a.) imprisonment in the county jail
for at least thirty days but not more than one year; b.) a minimum
fine of $375 but not more than $1,000; c.) license restriction for
three years allowing travel to and from work, to and from an alcohol treatment program, and within the scope of employment
where driving is necessary to the duties of the person's employment; and d.) participation for at least one year in an alcoholic
treatment program as provided in section 11837 - 11838.2 of the
Health and Safety Code.11O
c.) Penalties for Three or More Offenses Within Five Years.

Penalties for conviction of "felony drunk driving" when the offense occurred within five years of two or more convictions for
either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving demonstrate the
most effective means by which the new legislation will remove habitual drunk drivers from the road. New section 23190 requires
that, absent probation, the person be imprisoned in the state
prison for two, three, or four years, fined not less than $1,000 nor
2
more than $5,000,111 and have his license revoked for five years."
The court may grant probation to the three time offender.
107. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 38, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23186, 23206(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE §§ 23186, 23206(b)).
108. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, §§ 16, 38, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 271, 281 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13352(a) (4), and 23186 (West Supp. 1982) (to be
codified at CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13352(a) (4) and 23186). Under the old law, where a
person was convicted of felony "driving under the influence" and the offense occurred within five years of an offense which resulted in conviction of misdemeanor
"driving under the influence," probation was conditioned upon imprisonment of at
least five days but not more than one year, and a fine of at least $355 but not more
than $5,000. However, where the prior offense resulted in conviction of felony
"driving under the influence," probation was conditioned upon imprisonment of at
least 90 days but not more than one year, and a fine of at least $355 but not more
than $5,000. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23101 (West Supp. 1981) as amended by Act of
Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 26, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281 (West) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23186).
109. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 35, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West) (amending
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23186 (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23186).
110. This program is discussed supra note 83.
111. CAI VEH. CODE § 23190 (West Supp. 1982).
112. Id.; Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 35, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 280 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (6) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13352(a)(6)). Under the old law this person's license would be suspended for three years. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352 (West Supp. 1981) amended
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When this occurs, the probationary period must be for a minimum of three years. 1 13 The grant of probation must be conditioned upon imprisonment in the county jail for a minimum of
one year, a fine of at least $375 but not more than $5,000,114 license
suspension for a period of five years, 115 and participation for one
year in the alcohol treatment program provided for in sections
11837-11838.2 of the Health and Safety Code if this program was
not previously successfully completed pursuant to his second
116
offense.
3.

Miscellaneous New Penalty Provisions

The new drunk driving legislation contains two additional penalty provisions which are noteworthy. First, if a person is convicted of either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving, and the
vehicle used in the violation is registered to that person, it may be
impounded for up to thirty days at the owner's expense.117 Second, where a person has been convicted of an offense in another
state, possession, or territory of the United States, Puerto Rico,
the District of Columbia, or Canada which, if committed in California, would have constituted either felony or misdemeanor
drunk driving, the conviction will constitute a prior offense qualifying for increased second-offense sanctions. 118
III.

PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE NEW LEGISLAnON

In addition to the changes in the substantive, plea bargaining,
and sentencing provisions of the new law, there are a number of
problems posed by the legislation which should be understood by
a defense attorney before he undertakes to represent a client
charged with drunk driving. These problems include: a.) the conby Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 270 (West) (to be codified

at CAL.

VEH. CODE

§ 13352).

113. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 39, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281-82 (West)

(amending CAL. VEiH. CODE § 23191(a) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
§ 23191(a)).
114. Id.
115. Id.; Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 270-71 (West)
(amending CAL. VEI. CODE § 13352 (a) (6) West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.

VEH. CODE

§ 13352(a) (6)).
116.. Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 39, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 281-82 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 23191(b) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23191(b)). This program was discussed supra at note 83.
117. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23195 (West Supp. 1982).
VEH. CODE

118.

CAL. VEH. CODE

§ 23210 (West Supp. 1982).

sequences of a client's failure to successfully meet the terms and
conditions of probation; b.) whether a client should request probation when he has two prior felony or misdemeanor drunk driving convictions; c.) problems presented when a client has
separate felony and misdemeanor charges pending against him at
the same time; and d.) the desirability of a client being sentenced
to a work release program when sentenced to less than ten days
imprisonment.
A. Failureto Successfully Complete the Terms and Conditions
of Probation
Failure to meet the terms and conditions of probation are addressed in sections 23167,119 23187,120 and 23207121 of the Vehicle

Code. Sections 23167 and 23187 relate to failure of a person to successfully complete the alcohol treatment program, provided in the
Health and Safety Code, which was a condition of probation
granted under section 23166 or 23186. As such, sections 23167 and
23187 only apply to a grant of probation for conviction of secondoffense misdemeanors and felonies and where there is a failure to
complete the treatment program. Section 23207, however, serves
as a catch-all and applies when there is a violation of any other
term or condition of probation.
1. Failure to complete the treatment program provided in
sections 23166 and 23186
When a person is granted probation pursuant to sections 23166
and 23186,122 the court may condition probation upon successful
completion of an alcohol treatment program as provided in sections 11837-11838.2 of the Health and Safety Code.123 When a person fails to participate in this program, the court must revoke or
terminate the probation124 and proceed under one of two courses
of action. The court may order suspension for a one year period if
probation was granted under section 23166,125 or for a period of
three years if probation was granted under section 23186.126 Addi119. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23167 (West Supp. 1982).
120. CAL VEH. CODE § 23206(b) (West Supp. 1982).
121. CAL VEH. CODE § 23207 (West Supp. 1982).
122. See supra notes 77-84 and 108-110 and accompanying text.
123. This program is discussed supra note 83.
124. CAL VEH. CODE §§ 23167, 23187 (West Supp. 1982).
125. CAL VEH. CODE § 23167(a) (West Supp. 1982); Act of Feb. 18,
§ 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 271 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE §
(West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (3)).
126. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23187(a) (West Supp. 1982); Act of Feb. 18,
§ 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 271 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE §
(West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (4)).

1982, ch. 53,
13352(a) (3)
1982, ch. 53,
13352(a) (4)
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tionally, the court must reinstate the previously suspended sentence pursuant to section 1203.2(c) of the Penal Code.12 7 This
section provides that when judgment has been pronounced and
its execution suspended, the court may revoke the suspension
28
and order that the judgment take full force and effect.1
Alternatively, the court may grant a new term of probation conditioned upon a minimum time of confinement in the county jail
and order suspension of the person's license. If probation was
granted pursuant to section 23166, the minimum time of confinement is thirty days,129 and the period of license suspension is one
year.130 However, if probation was granted pursuant to section
23186, the minimum time of confinement is ninety days131 and the
32
license suspension will be for a period of three years.1
2.

Revocation of probation under section 23207

Section 23207 provides for revocation of probation in all other
instances when the terms and conditions of probation have been
violated. When this occurs, section 23207 provides that "the court
shall revoke the suspension of sentence, revoke or terminate probation, and shall proceed in the manner provided in subdivision
(c) of section 1203.2 of the Penal Code."'1 33 Section 1203.2(c) of
the Penal Code provides: "[Ihf the judgment has been pronounced and the execution thereof has been suspended, the court
may revoke such suspension and order that the judgment shall
be in full force and effect." 3 4 At this point one can see that a subtle conflict exists between Vehicle Code section 23207 and Penal
127. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23167(a), 23187(a) (West Supp. 1982).
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(c) (West Supp. 1982). While there is language
contained in § 1203.2 relating to cases where sentencing has been suspended, this
language is inapplicable in the present context since the Vehicle Code precludes a
court from staying or suspending pronouncement of sentencing. See CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23206(a) (West Supp. 1982).
129. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23167(b) (West Supp. 1982).
130. Id.; Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 270-71 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH.CODE § 13352(a) (3) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (3)).
131. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23187(b) (West Supp. 1982).
132. Id.; Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 53, § 16, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 270 (West)
(amending CAL. VEH.CODE § 13352 (a) (4) (West Supp. 1982) (to be codified at CAL.

§ 13352(a) (4)).
133. CAL. VER. CODE § 23207 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(c) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). The
new drunk driving legislation requires a court to pronounce sentencing. See CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23206(a) (West Supp. 1982).
VEH. CODE

Code section 1203.2. The Vehicle Code section mandates that the
court revoke suspension of the sentence and revoke or terminate
probation, while the Penal Code section states that the court may
revoke suspension of the sentence and order the judgment shall
be in full force and effect. As a result of this conflict, a defense
attorney may argue that, pursuant to section 1203.2, the defendant
may not be required to go to jail for violation of probation. On the
other hand, the court may find that since section 23207 required
revocation of sentencing and probation, section 23207 deprives the
court of any discretion which may have existed pursuant to section 1203.2.135
B. Avoiding the Treatment Program Where the Defendant Has
Two PriorConvictions
The defendant who has two prior convictions for felony or misdemeanor drunk driving should think carefully before requesting
probation for his third offense. Where a person is convicted of
"misdemeanor drunk driving," and this offense occurred within
five years of two or more convictions of either felony or misdemeanor drunk driving, the court must sentence the defendant to a
minimum of 120 days in jail, fine him at least $375, and suspend
his license for three years. 136 This punishment follows regardless
of whether or not the defendant is granted probation. If the court
grants probation it must be conditioned upon participation in an
alcohol treatment program if he has not previously completed the
program.137 As a result, the defendant may be subjected to a harsher penalty when granted probation than he would have received without a grant of probation. In this regard, should the
court offer probation to the defendant, it may be desirable to refuse the offer. In so doing, the defendant could avoid participation in the treatment program. Extreme care should be used in
reaching such a decision, however. While the defendant may be
able to avoid participation in the treatment program by refusing
probation, this refusal may cause the judge to sentence the defendant to increased jail time.1 38 Therefore, before reaching a decision to refuse probation, the defendant should be certain that he
will receive the minimum jail sentence.
135. Since language contained in Vehicle Code §§ 23167 and 23187 is similar to
that contained in § 23207, these arguments would apply in those contexts as well.

136. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
138. In the downtown division of the Los Angeles Traffic Court some judges
have indicated that they might increase a defendant's term of imprisonment
should the defendant refuse an offer of probation. Interview with Michael Judge,
head of the Los Angeles Public Defender Traffic Division. (October 22, 1982).
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C. Separate Felony and Misdemeanor Charges Pending Against
the Defendant at the Same Time
A defense attorney may retain a client who was initially arrested for "misdemeanor drunk driving" and while out on bail or
released on his own recognizance was subsequently arrested for
"felony drunk driving." To avoid the possibility of a malpractice
suit, if the misdemeanor charge cannot be plea bargained to a
charge of reckless driving,139 the defendant should be instructed
to plead to the felony before pleading to the misdemeanor.
To illustrate, if the defense attorney mistakenly instructs his
client to plead "guilty" or "nolo contendere" to the misdemeanor
charge first, this conviction constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of the "felony drunk driving" violation. In this situation, assuming a grant of probation, the defendant will receive a
minimum jail term totaling thirty days.140 On the other hand, had
the defendant first pleaded "guilty" to the felony offense, and
then to the misdemeanor offense, he would be subject to a minimum jail term totaling seven days.'41 Where this same client has
an additional prior conviction for felony or misdemeanor drunk
driving, the need to plead guilty to the felony first is even greater.
Should the attorney mistakenly instruct his client to plead to the
misdemeanor first, the client will be subject to a minimum jail
term totaling one year and forty-eight hours.142 On the other
hand, if the attorney instructed the client to plead to the felony
first, he would be subject to a minimum term of imprisonment to139. An "alcohol-related reckless driving" conviction does not constitute a prior
offense for purposes of a subsequent "felony drunk driving" conviction. See supra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text. As such, a defendant will not subject himself
to second offense penalties for the "felony drunk driving" charge by pleading
guilty to "alcohol related reckless driving."
140. This term of imprisonment includes both the minimum sentence for an initial conviction of "misdemeanor drunk driving" (or no mandatory jail time) and
the minimum term of imprisonment for a conviction of "felony drunk driving"
where there is one prior conviction (30 days). See supra notes 71, 109 and accompanying text.
141. This term of imprisonment includes both the minimum sentence for an initial conviction of "felony drunk driving" (five days) and the minimum term of imprisonment for a conviction of "misdemeanor drunk driving" where there is one
prior conviction (48 hours). See supra notes 80, 103 and accompanying text.
142. This term of imprisonment includes both the minimum sentence for a conviction of "misdemeanor drunk driving" with one prior conviction (48 hours) and
the minimum sentence for a conviction of "felony drunk driving" with two prior
convictions (one year). See supra notes 80, 114 and accompanying text.

taling 240 days.143
D. Work Release
A person convicted of "misdemeanor drunk driving" who is sentenced to the county jail for forty-eight hours, 4 4 should explore
the possibility of obtaining a work release pursuant to section
4024.2 of the Penal Code. Section 4024.2 allows a defendant who is
sentenced to county jail to "perform 10 hours of labor on the public works or ways in lieu of one day of confinement."' 45 If this
person is allowed to participate in a public works program, he
need only perform twenty hours of public work as an alternative
to a forty-eight hour jail sentence. On the other hand, since the
sentence for "misdemeanor drunk driving" is expressed in terms
of hours, and section 4024.2 speaks in terms of "days of confinement," it may be that the defendant is ineligible to participate in
the public works program.
IV.

POTENTIAL LEGAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE NEW LEGISLATION

There are a number of possible challenges to the new drunk
driving legislation. The statute is most vulnerable to an attack asserting that the drunk driving law requires the defendant to produce evidence in support of his innocence lest he be convicted.
Such a requirement deprives the defendant of his constitutionally
guaranteed presumption of innocence. A closely related argument is that because the statute requires the defendant to come
forward with evidence supporting his innocence, the new law violates his constitutional right to remain silent. Moreover, the legislative establishment of presumptions of guilt may well deprive
the defendant of his right to a fair trial, and violate the prohibition
against bills of attainder, as well as the separation of powers doctrine. The drunk driving law may also be attacked on grounds
that it violates the defendant's right to due process and constitutes an invalid strict liability statute.
143. This term of imprisonment includes both the minimum sentence for a conviction of "felony drunk driving" with one prior conviction (120 days) and the minimum sentence for a conviction of misdemeanor drunk driving with two prior
convictions (120 days). See supra notes 86, 104 and accompanying text.
144. Such a sentence may result from either an initial conviction for "misdemeanor drunk driving," or a conviction for "misdemeanor drunk driving" where
the defendant has one prior offense. See supra notes 69, 80 and accompanying
text.
145. CAL.PENAL CODE § 4024.2(a) (West Supp. 1982). This provision does not
apply to persons committed for longer than six days. Id. at § 4024.2(c).

[Vol. 10: 91, 1982]

Drunk Driving Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

A.

Presumption of Innocence

Perhaps the strongest legal presumption in American jurisprudence is that the accused is innocent until proved guilty.146 The
presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, has been deemed a basic component of a fair trial under
our criminal justice system.147 In California, the presumption of
innocence has not only been recognized in case law,148 but it has
been codified as well.149 As a result of this presumption, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused is guilty of the charged crime.150 Stated differently, "[t] he prosecution must exclude any reasonable doubt, and
the defendant is not required to produce any evidence nor raise a
reasonable doubt of his guilt, he can 'sit on his hands' and put the
5
prosecution to its proof."1 '
The California drunk driving law seemingly transgresses upon
an accused's presumption of innocence. If a defendant is charged
with "driving under the influence" and evidence is introduced
showing that he had a blood-alcohol level of .10 or greater, the
defendant must produce evidence showing that he was not under
the influence of alcohol or he will be presumed to have been
"driving under the influence."1 52 The law pertaining to ".10 driving" mandates that a jury convict a defendant if his blood-alcohol
level is .10 or more at the time he was driving.153 Before determining whether these provisions violate an accused's presump146. In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), Justice Powell stated, "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law." Id. at 483. (quoting Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
147. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
148. See United States v. Lake, 482 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1973); Cantillon v. Superior
Court (Los Angeles), 305 F. Supp. 304 (C.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Carr, 21
F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
149. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1970) ("A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved ...
." Id.); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 520 (West 1966) ("The party claiming that a person is guilty of crime or
wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that issue." Id.).
150. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
151. Taylor, Blood-Alcohol Presumptions: Guilty Until Proven Innocent, CAL.
ST. B.J., May-June 1978, at 170 (citing United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965));
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1894).
152. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 15, 16, 21 and accompanying text.

tion of innocence, it is necessary to
presumptions as it exists in California.

examine

the law of

1. The Law of Presumptions
A presumption is defined as "an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or
otherwise established in ... [an] action." 154 A presumption may
55
be classified as either a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption.1
A conclusive presumption requires the trier of fact to find the
existence of the presumed fact regardless of the strength of the
evidence opposing the existence of this fact. 56 On the other hand,
where a presumption is rebuttable, the trier of fact is not required
57
to find the existence of the presumed fact.1
Rebuttable presumptions may be classified into one of two categories; those presumptions which affect the burden of producing
58
evidence, and those presumptions affecting the burden of proof.
The distinction between these two presumptions lies in the reason that the presumption was established. A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is established solely to
facilitate the determination of a particular action 59 and is an expression of experience rather than an expression of policy.60 On
the other hand, a presumption affecting the burden of proof is established to implement some public policy other than that of facilitating the determination of the action.16' The effect of a
rebuttable presumption depends upon whether it is classified as a
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence or affecting the burden of proof. A presumption affecting the burden of
producing evidence requires the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced
which would support its nonexistence. When such evidence is introduced, the trier of fact determines the existence or nonexis154. CAL. EVID. CODE § 600 (West 1966).
155. Cal. Evid. Code § 601 (West 1966). For a more detailed analysis concerning
the law of presumptions as it affects drunk driving cases see Comment, The Constitutionality of California's Under-the-Influence-of-Alcohol Presumption, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 955 (1972).
156. See Comment, supra note 155.
157. See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
158. CAL. EVID. CODE § 601 (West 1966).
159. CAL. EvD. CODE § 603 (West 1966).

160. Id. (Commentary - Law Revision Commission). Typical rebuttable presumptions which affect the burden of producing evidence include the presumption
that a mailed letter was received, and presumptions relating to the authenticity of
documents. Id.
161. CAL. EVID. CODE § 605 (West 1966). Typically these presumptions arise to
facilitate public policies such as those in favor of legitimacy of children, the validity of marriage, the stability of titles to property, and the security of those who entrust themselves to the administration of others. Id.
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tence of this fact from the evidence and without regard to the
presumption. 162 The effect of a rebuttable presumption affecting
the burden of proof, however, "is to impose upon the party
against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexis1 63
tence of the presumed fact."
2.

Constitutional Validity of the ".10 Presumption"

Section 23155(a) (3) provides that where a defendant is charged
with either felony or misdemeanor driving under the influence,
and his blood-alcohol level is .10 or more, the defendant is presumed to have been driving under the influence. 6 4 Section
23155(c), however, allows the defendant to introduce evidence
showing that he was not under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the time of the offense.165 This presumption is identical
to the law as it existed prior to the new drunk driving legislation.
Case law has determined that this presumption is a rebuttable
66
presumption which affects the burden of proof.1
The ".10 presumption" clashes directly with a defendant's presumption of innocence. In effect, the California legislature has
deprived the accused of his constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. Due to the nature of presumptions which affect
the burden of proof, should the defendant elect to "sit on his
hands" and put the prosecution to its proof, the jury will have no
choice but to find the defendant guilty of "driving under the influence." This legislative establishment of a presumption of guilt is
clearly at odds with Justice Holmes' statement that, "[Ilt is not
within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty
or presumptively guilty of a crime."167 This seemingly blatant violation of an accused's constitutional rights has largely been ignored. Only two appellate decisions have addressed this
constitutional issue, and both have upheld the statute for errone162. CAL. EvID. CODE § 604 (West 1966).

163. CAL. EvD. CODE § 606 (West 1966). An example of a rebuttable presumption which affects the burden of proof is that a defendant in a criminal action is
presumed to be conscious at the time of the criminal act if the defendant acted as
though he were conscious. See People v. Kitt, 83 Cal. App. 3d 834, 148 Cal. Rptr
447 (1978); People v. Martina, 140 Cal. App. 2d 17, 294 P.2d 1015 (1956).
164. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. See People v. Lachman, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 100 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1972). See
also Taylor, supra note 151, at 170.
167. McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 7&, 86 (1916).

ous reasons.1 68
In People v. Lachman,169 Lachman was convicted of felony
"driving under the influence" of an intoxicating liquor. On appeal,
Lachman argued that the use of the ".10 presumption" violated
his presumption of innocence. The court found that this presumption was constitutional, ruling:
A statutory presumption affecting the burden of proof in a criminal cause
does not alter the People's duty to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It merely allows proof of an ultimate fact by permitting
that fact to be presumed from proof of a preliminary fact. Whether the ultimate fact is proved by direct evidence or by a presumption which arises
from proof of a preliminary fact, the defendant's burden of rebuttal redoubt as to the sufficiency
mains the same: he need only raise
70 a reasonable
of the proof of the ultimatefact.1

The language of this holding indicates that the court failed to
realize that a defendant is presumed innocent until he is proven
guilty. As such, the defendant is not required to produce evidence in support of his innocence. In this regard, the California
Supreme Court has stated that "it is error to intimate to the jury
that any burden of persuasion rests upon the defendant on the
17
trial of the general issue." 1
In People v. Schrieber,172 Schrieber was convicted by a justice
court jury of "driving under the influence" of intoxicating liquor.
Schrieber challenged his conviction on the grounds that the ".10
presumption" violated his presumption of innocence as well as
his right against self-incrimination. This court, as did the Lachman court, erroneously ruled that the ".10 presumption" required
that the defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt as to the
sufficiency of the proof of the ultimate fact in order to overcome
168. See generally Taylor, supra note 151. These cases were People v.
Schrieber, 45 Cal. App. 3d 917, 119 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975), and People v. Lachman, 23
Cal. App. 3d 1094, 100 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1972). Recently, in Hernandez v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 634 P.2d 917, 177 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1981), the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the old California drunk
driving law. This decision, however, did not rule as to whether the drunk driving
statute violated a defendant's presumption of innocence, rather, that it did not deprive a defendant of his substantive due process rights. The majority ruled that
the right to drive was not a fundamental right. Justice Newman concurred and argued that while the right to drive was a fundamental right, the statute met the
strict scrutiny test. Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Bird, also ruled that the right
to drive is a fundamental right, but that they were not prepared to declare that the
statute failed to meet the strict scrutiny test. For a more detailed discussion of
Hernandez, see The California Supreme Court Survey, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 939,
952-60 (1982).
169. 23 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 100 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1972).
170. Id. at 1097, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 712 (emphasis added).
171. People v. Letourneau, 34 Cal. 2d 478, 491, 211 P.2d 865, 872-73 (1949) (emphasis in original). Accord People v. Loggins, 23 Cal. App. 3d 597, 100 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1972) (error occurs if a trial court tells a jury that any burden of persuasion rests
on the defense as to the general issue of guilt). See also Taylor, supra note 151.
172. 45 Cal. App. 3d 917, 119 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
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the ".10 presumption." Moreover, the court premised the validity
of the ".10 presumption" on the United States Supreme Court decision of United States v. Gainey.173 In that case, Gainey was convicted of possession, custody, or control of an unregistered still.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction pursuant to a federal
statute which authorized a jury to infer guilt of substantive offenses from the defendant's unexplained presence at the illegal
still. While this statute appeared to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant, the Supreme Court noted that the jury was instructed that the defendant's failure to explain his presence at the
still would not require a conviction from the jury. Rather, the
trial court instructed the jury that failure of the defendant to explain his presence was "one circumstance to be considered among
many" 174 and that if the defendant's presence remained unex-

plained "the jury could nonetheless acquit him if it found that the
Government had not proved his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."1T5 This instruction was little more than a comment on the
evidence rather than a firm presumption shifting the burden of
76
proof to the defendant.1
In summary, the ".10 presumption" clearly shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant requiring him to produce evidence supporting his innocence. As a result, this statute not only deprives a
defendant of his presumption of innocence, it also violates his
right against self-incrimination. 177 Absent any jury instruction
such as the one given in Gainey, informing the jury that they may
acquit the defendant even if he presents no evidence in support
of his innocence, a conviction for drunk driving pursuant to the
".10 presumption" would violate the defendant's constitutional
rights and should be reversed on appeal.
3. Constitutional Validity of the Crime of ".10 Driving"
Subsection (b) of sections 23152 and 23153 requires a jury to
find a person guilty of ".10 driving" when the prosecution does
nothing more than show that the defendant's blood-alcohol level
173. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Taylor, supra note 151, at 174.
177. The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment guarantees the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the "unfettered exercise
of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence." Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1964). See also Taylor, supra note 151.

was .10 or more at the time he was driving. 7 8 The result of these
sections is to establish a conclusive presumption as to his guilt,
regardless of strong evidence introduced that shows that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol. As discussed
above, it is clearly improper for the legislature to establish such a
179
presumption of guilt.
Additionally, language in Gainey seemingly questions the propriety of a conclusive presumption in favor of a defendant's guilt.
The Supreme Court carefully noted that the "statutory inference
was not conclusive"18 0 and that the defendant's unexplained presence at the still was one circumstance to be considered among
many. A close reading of subsection (b) of sections 23152 and
23153 shows that if the prosecutor introduces evidence that the
defendant's blood-alcohol level was .10 or more at the time he was
driving, the trial judge must instruct the jury that this evidence
establishes a conclusive presumption of guilt.' 8 ' In short, evidence of .10 blood-alcohol content is not one circumstance among
many to be considered by the jury in reaching its verdict; it is the
only evidence to be considered.
The legislature's establishment of the "three hour presumption"' 8 2 is likewise unconstitutional. This presumption allows a
prosecutor to obtain a conviction for ".10 driving" based on evidence obtained three hours after the defendant was driving unless the defendant produces evidence to rebut the presumption.
As such, this presumption affects the defendant's burden of proof
and constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the accused's
presumption of innocence.183 Moreover, the "three hour presumption" bears no correlation with reality. Since alcohol is not
absorbed into one's blood immediately after it is consumed, it is
possible for one's blood-alcohol level to be .04 at the time when he
84
was arrested and .12 when the test is taken three hours later.1
In summary, the presumptions established by the California
drunk driving legislation affect the burden of proof rather than
the burden of producing evidence. This imposes upon the defend178. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 164-176 and accompanying text.
180. 380 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added).
181. The jury instruction given at a trial for "misdemeanor .10 driving" provides, "[a ny person who drives a vehicle with one-tenth of one percent (0.10%)
alcohol in his blood, is guilty of a misdemeanor." CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 16.830.1 (West Supp. 1982).
182. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
183. The "three hour presumption" is similar to the .10 presumption in that it
requires the defendant to prove his innocence. Such a requirement is unconstitutional. See supra notes 164-176 and accompanying text.
184. See Judge, supra note 138.
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ant the burden of proving he was not driving "under the influence" of alcohol. In drunk driving cases the defendant can no
longer "sit on his hands" in exercise of his constitutionally guaranteed right of presumption of innocence and right against selfincrimination. Instead, the California blood-alcohol presumptions
statutorily relieve the prosecution of its heavy burden of proof
and places it squarely and unconstitutionally upon the shoulders
of the defendant. This forces the defendant to prove his innocence while permitting the prosecution to "sit on its hands." Finally, the legislative establishment of these presumptions not
only violates a defendant's right to a presumption of innocence,
and his right against self-incrimination, it also:
deprives [the] defendant of the right to have a jury decide what conclusions to draw from the proven facts, violates the prohibition of bills of attainder by allowing the defendant to be convicted on the basis of facts
found by the legislature rather than the court, and violates the separation
of powers doctrine by allocating to the Legislature a judicial fact-finding
function. 185

B. Adequate Notice
The new drunk driving law states that the defendant commits a
crime if he is found driving with a blood-alcohol level of .10 or
more.' 86 This new crime of ".10 driving" presents serious constitutional questions because the driver will be unable to ascertain
whether his blood-alcohol level is .10 or more at any particular
time. Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice as to the conduct it proscribes. The statute must afford persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited so that they may act accordingly. That
the terms of a penal statute "must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a well recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
87
settled rules of law."1
A person charged with ".10 driving" might argue that he is un185. See Comment, supra note 155, at 994.
186. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
187. Keeler v. Superior Court (Amador County), 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633, 470 P.2d 617,
626 (1970) 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 490, (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926)). Accord People v. Barben, 88 Cal. App. 3d 215, 151 Cal. Rptr. 717
(1979) ("Due process demands that those subject to a state's penal laws be sufficiently informed as to what is commanded or forbidden before they may be prose" Id. at 218, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 719).
cuted thereunder ..

able to ascertain when his blood-alcohol content reaches the statutory level of .10 or more. Since the defendant is unable to
determine that his blood-alcohol content has reached this level,
the drunk driving law arguably fails to provide adequate notice in
violation of his right to due process. 188 This argument, however,
is not likely to prevail since the statute specifically states that
driving at a blood-alcohol level of .10 or more constitutes an illegal
act. While a person may not reasonably. know at what point his
blood-alcohol level actually reaches this level, information is readily available to the public which describes the amount of liquor
one must consume to reach this level.' 89 For this reason, the statutory language makes it reasonably certain as to the conduct prohibited by the statute.
C.

Strict Liability Statute

Another potential challenge to the drunk driving legislation is
that it creates an invalid strict liability statute. The California Penal Code provides that "[i]n every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent .... "t90
However, a person driving with a blood-alcohol level of .10 or
more is guilty of ".10 driving" regardless of whether he intended
to commit such an offense.191 As such, the California legislature
has created a strict liability offense which appears to violate the
Penal Code.
The prosecutor may be expected to argue that even though the
188. The proper procedure under these circumstances would be to fie a pretrial motion to dismiss in the form of a demurrer pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1004 (West 1970). See People v. Schoonover, 5 Cal. App. 3d 101, 85 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1970), where the defendant argued that the old felony "driving under the influence" law gave him no adequate notice as to the acts prohibited by the law. The
court ruled, in part, that since the defendant failed to demur, the terms of the
pleading were sufficient.
189. The California Driver's Handbook contains a chart which details the
number of drinks that a person may consume per hour without raising his blood
alcohol level to an illegal level. See CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S HANDBOOK 2 (1982).
190. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970).
191. One commentator has noted that the crime of drunk driving is, oddly
enough, analogous to pornography. See, Taylor supra note 151, at 170-71. Taylor
argues that neither crime requires any specific intent and neither consists of a definable offense. He then notes the inconsistent manner in which the law handles
these offenses. In pornography cases the ultimate issue of guilt is decided by the
jury and their decision is guided by concepts such as "redeeming social value,"
"contemporary community standards," and "prurient interests." Moreover, in pornography cases, no legal presumptions are drawn from evidence introduced at
trial. In drunk driving cases, however, the legislature has solved the problems
caused by the fact that drunk driving is not a definable offense by instructing the
jury that if the defendant's blood-alcohol level is greater than .10, the defendant is
presumed guilty.
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legislation does create a strict liability offense, it does so pursuant
to an exception to the general rule against strict liability offenses.
Case law has recognized that the legislature may pass strict liability statutes where the statute is an expression of a legislative policy to be served by strict liability. 92 Legislative policies which
have been deemed sufficient to qualify for this exception include
protection of society, 9 3 family and infant females, 9 4 and protection of inmates and prison officials against assaults by armed prisoners. 95 Since the long-range purpose of drunk driving legislation
is to reduce traffic fatalities caused by inebriated drivers by eliminating these drivers from the highways, 96 it is likely that the new
drunk driving legislation will survive the strict liability challenge.
In any event, a defense attorney should request that a mens rea
instruction be given to the jury. If the instruction is denied, the
defense will have effectively preserved and framed the issue for
appeal.
V.

IMPACT

The drunk driving legislation has been in effect long enough to
gain some insight as to the impact it may be expected to have. Initially, it appears that the legislation has resulted in an increase
in not guilty pleas and has placed a correspondingly heavy burden on the judicial and law enforcement systems. Moreover,
192. See People v. Darby, 114 Cal. App. 2d 412, 250 P.2d 743 (1952) ("To save the
state from certain acts universally deemed to be inimical to the public welfare, it
is sufficient if the act is forbidden and a penalty is prescribed for its violation. The
intent is imputed." Id. at 427, 250 P.2d at 754 (citing People v. Pearson, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 9, 244 P.2d 35 (1952)). Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) ("it is
doubtless competent for the States to create strict criminal liabilities by defining
criminal offenses without any element of scienter... .'Id. at 150.).
193. See People v. Darby, 114 Cal. App. 412, 250 P.2d 743 (1952).
194. See People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1964) (crime of statutory rape).
195. See People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1968) (crime of
possession of a sharp instrument while confined in a state prison); People v.
Steely, 266 Cal. App. 2d 591, 72 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1968) (same). Some commentators
would argue that "possession" crimes are not strict liability crimes because these
crimes require some awareness as to the nature of the item in their possession in
addition to mere possession. See F. SMrri, THE CRIMINAL LAW COLOR BOOK 257
(1978).
196. People v. Schrieber, 45 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 119 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1975)
(citing Finley v. Orr, 262 Cal. App. 2d 656, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1968)). Cf.Hernandez
v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d. 70, 634 P.2d 917, 177 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1982) (legislature has broad authority to regulate with respect to safety hazards related to
driving).

while the apparent purpose of this legislation is to remove the
drunk driver from California's highways, it is currently experiencing little success in this regard.
A.

Impact on the JudicialSystem

Due to the changes the new law imposes upon the practice of
plea bargaining, today's plea bargain from a charge of "driving
under the influence" to the lesser charge of reckless driving may
well become tomorrow's conviction for purposes of second-offense
punishment. The combination of this fact with the fact that there
is no mandatory jail sentence for "misdemeanor drunk driving"
makes it apparent that a first time misdemeanor offender may
have little to gain by entering into a plea bargain to a charge of
reckless driving. For these reasons, one might expect to see a reduction of guilty pleas and an increase in the number of trials.
The most recent statistics have indicated that this is indeed the
case. During the first five months of 1982, in the downtown Los
Angeles traffic court there was an increase in not guilty pleas of
thirty-four percent and a nineteen percent increase in drunk driving trials.197 The resulting increase in trials has had a dramatic
impact upon a court's calendar of drunk driving cases. During the
month of May, the downtown traffic court was forced to grant a
ninety-seven percent increase in the number of continuances.198
The increase in the number of continuances is largely attributed
to lack of court space resulting from an increase in the number of
drunk driving trials.199 The severity of penalties for those convicted of drunk driving, and the creation of the crime of ".10 driving," may also be contributing to the increasing number of drunk
driving trials.200
The new drunk driving law has had a dramatic impact on the
California judicial system. This impact, however, may not be limited to an increase in requests for trials and continuances. As a
result of the increase in the number of trials, the public defender's office will be required to assign work to private attorneys,
197. L.A. Times, supra note 55, at 19, col. 4.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. In Washington a law similar to the one in California was enacted in 1980.
Under the Washington law a person is guilty of driving while intoxicated where
his blood-alcohol level reaches or exceeds .10. The law also imposed a mandatory
one day jail sentence for first time offenders and increased penalties for repeat offenders. During the first six months of 1980, requests for jury trials increased in

nearly all counties of Washington. See WASHINGTON DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

SHB 665: THE NEW DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED LAw 16 (December 1980) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
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police officers' overtime will increase, and the efficiency with
201
which the judicial system handles these cases will decrease.
The logical remedy to the detrimental impact on the criminal
justice system caused by the new drunk driving law would be to
increase the amount of money made available to the judicial system. This money could be used to alleviate the overcrowded
court system. Oddly enough, however, the California legislature
recently quashed an assembly bill which would have increased liquor taxes and earmarked the new revenues for drunk driving
202
enforcement.
B. Impact of the New Penalty Provisions
Presumably, the long range goal of the penalty provisions of the
new law is to remove drunk drivers from the state's highways.
While it remains to be seen whether this "get-tough" legislation
will achieve this goal, there are a number of studies which suggest that the more severe penalties will have no long-range impact on the incidence of drunk driving. Moreover, the imposition
of these penalties may result in increased jury verdicts of "not
203
guilty" in drunk driving cases.
The new California drunk driving law is one of numerous variations of a "Scandinavian-type" law which is found in most of this
country's fifty states. This type of law defines alcohol impairment
offenses in terms of blood-alcohol content equaling or exceeding a
specified level. 2 04 A recent study has found that while enactment
of deterrent programs based upon "Scandinavian-type" laws may
reduce the incidence of drunk driving in the short run, alcohol-related crashes and casualties will approach prior trends within a
matter of months, or, at most, within a few years of reform.2 05
201. L.A. Times, supra note 55 at 20, cols. 1-2. In assessing the impact of the
Washington drunk driving law, supra note 200, the Washington Department of
Criminal Justice expressed deep concern for the impact of increasing requests for
jury trials attributable to the fact that defendants sought to avoid severe penalties
provided by the new law. The report stated that the new law "could ultimately
produce a major and costly workload impact on the courts." WASHINGTON DIVISION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

supra note 200, at 16. This report also found that the Wash-

ington law significantly increased the cost of operating the state's jails. These
costs were absorbed by the penal system resulting in a decrease in the quality and
efficiency of other services provided by these institutions. Id. at vi.
202. L.A. Times, supra note 55, at 20, col. 2.
203. I.I.H.S., supra note 3, at 10.
204. Id. at 2.
205. Id. at 2-3.

This short run reduction is attributed to the fact that reform programs typically are accompanied by extensive publicity which
leads the public to believe that there is an increase in the risk of
being apprehended and convicted. Unfortunately, the public soon
realizes that this fear is illusory, and the deterrent effect is ultimately lost.206 Finally, studies suggest that for drunk driving laws
to act as a deterrent, the legislation should focus on implementation of swift and certain penalties for alcohol-related driving offenses. 20 7 Increasing only the severity of punishment has no
effect on drunk driving offenses and may even be counterproductive where they result in fewer drunk driving arrests by police of20 8
ficers, plea bargaining, or increased findings of not guilty.
Early statistics in California conform with the finding that
"Scandinavian-type" laws will result in a decrease in the incidence of drunk driving only in the short run. These statistics also
indicate that the deterrent effect of the new legislation may already be wearing off. Statistics for January, 1982 indicate that the
incidence of drunk driving related offenses was significantly lower
than during the prior year. Between six o'clock in the evening of
December 31, 1981 and six o'clock in the morning on January 1,
1982, the first day the law went into effect, 659 drivers were arrested for alcohol-related offenses as compared to 836 arrested
during the same twelve hour period the prior year.20 9 During the
month of January, arrests for drunk driving by Los Angeles Sheriff's deputies decreased seventy-nine percent, and arrests across
the state were down ten percent. Alcohol-related deaths in Janu210
ary dropped thirty-three percent.
The end of January, however, also seems to have marked the
end of the deterrent effect of the new law. From February 1, 1982
to May 31, 1982, drunk driving deaths dropped a mere 2.7% as
compared to that period in 1981.211 In April of this year the
number of alcohol-related deaths actually exceeded the number
for April of 1981.212 Additionally, the decrease in drunk driving arrests during January did not last, and by the end of July the Cali206. Id. at 2-3, 11. Studies indicate that nationally, only one in 1,000 drunk drivers will be detected and one-half of these drivers are caught only because they
were involved in accidents. Kraus, Reducing Drunk Driving - The California
Dream, J. BEv. HuLis B.A., Spring 1982, at 99, 101. This means that a driver will
have to commit from 200 to 2,000 drunk driving offenses to be caught. I.I.H.S.,
supra note 3, at 11.
207. I.I.H.S., supra note 3, at 1, 2.
208. Id. at 10.
209. Kraus, supra note 206 at 100.
210. L.A. Times, supra note 56, at 3, cols. 2-3.
211. Id. at 3, col. 3.
212. Id.
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fornia Highway Patrol had stopped more people for drunk driving
than during the same seven-month period for 1981.213 During the
month of July, serious alcohol-related accidents in Los Angeles
increased twofold over the number of similar accidents during
July 1981.214 These statistics clearly indicate that there is little, if
any, deterrent effect remaining in the current drunk driving law.
In this regard, Michael Tynan, presiding judge at the Los Angeles
downtown traffic court stated, "[The law's effect] is almost zero,
215
in terms of keeping people from doing anything."
The strong penalties provided by the new drunk driving statute
may also make it more difficult to obtain a conviction for drunk
driving. Typically it is difficult for prosecutors to obtain a conviction for drunk driving due to sympathetic juries. 216 The imposition of enhanced penalties may render it even more difficult to
obtain a guilty verdict.
Faced with a drunk driving law which is apparently ineffective
in keeping drunk drivers off the state's highways, the question
now becomes, "What to do?" One might follow the suggestion of
Assemblywoman Jean Moorhead, principal author of the current
drunk driving law and, "get tougher. ' '217 The legislature, however,
has already tried this approach and it has failed to produce results. Moreover, as indicated above, studies indicate that a "get
tough" attitude is not likely to produce long term results. For any
further drunk driving legislation to be successful, the legislature
must reexamine the theories upon which the legislation is
founded.
At the present time, the most promising approach in deterring
213. During the first seven months of 1982 the California Highway Patrol pulled
over 76,065 people for drunk driving as compared to 76,099 during the same time
period last year. Id.
214. Id. at 19, col. 1.

215. Id. at 3, col. 3.
216. L.A. Daily Journal, Mar. 11, 1981, § 1 at 6, col. 3. This phenomenon has been
dubbed the "there but for the grace of God go I" syndrome and is often the cornerstone of a drunk driving defense. This defense plays upon the sympathies of the
jury by placing them in the shoes of the accused. Starr and Shapiro, How Drunks
Get Off, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 38. This tactic is highly successful and it
may, at times, border on the unethical. For example, one Dallas defense attorney
concluded his summation to the jury by "stage-whispering" to his client's four
children, "Kids, I've done everything I can for your daddy." Then, pointing to the
jury he added, "Now it's up to these folks here." The defendant was acquitted in
fifteen minutes. Id.

217. L.A. Times, supra note 55, at 3, col. 1.

drunk driving is to provide for swift and certain penalties. 218 An
integral part of this type of legislation would be the provision of
funds necessary to enforce the law. As indicated above, the
courts have a backlog because of the new drunk driving law and
the number of continuances granted by courts is on the upswing 2 19 The resulting delay effectively precludes any possibility
that a person charged with drunk driving will receive swift
punishment.
Before the legislature makes any further changes in the California drunk driving law, it should consider two new approaches to
the drunk driving problem. One approach would be to increase
and maintain driver perceptions that large-scale enforcement of
the drunk driving law is in effect, and that sure, severe, and swift
punishment will follow all drunk driving offenses. 220 This publicity may also have to be accompanied by a more obtrusive enforcement program including police roadblocks at which all drivers are
tested for alcohol. 22 1 Such a program, however, would give rise to
constitutional problems as well as extensive political and economic costs.
A second approach would be to establish an administrative
agency to handle first-time misdemeanor offenses. 222 For firsttime offenders the criminal definition of alcohol-impaired driving
would be abandoned, thus avoiding the prolonged process of arrest and criminal conviction. This approach would serve to manipulate the critical factors of certainty and speed in dispatching
punishment in drunk driving cases instead of making punishment
more severe. Punishment might include suspension of one's drivers license for a short period of time.223 Since the objective to
this program would be to ensure swift and certain punishment,
there would be no need to impose severe penalties for an initial
offense. 224 Repeat offenders, however, would be subject to crimi218. I.I.H.S., supra note 3, at 1.
219. See supra notes 197-200.
220. I.I.H.S., supra note 3, at 10.
221. Id.
222. Id. The propriety of authorizing adminstrative rather than judicial adjudication of traffic infractions punishable by fine only, was established in Rosenthal v.
Harnett, 36 N.Y.2d 269, 326 N.E.2d 811, 367 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1975).
223. I.I.H.S., supra note 3, at 10. In Minnesota, motor vehicle administration officials have been given power to suspend the licenses of people arrested for drunk
driving before a trial court determines guilt or innocence. This practice has
proven to be a successful deterrent to drunk driving. See L.A. Times, supra note
55, at 20, col. 3.
224. This approach would avoid problems caused by strict penalties for driving
offenses such as the "there but for the grace of God go I" syndrome, supra note
216, exercise of leniency by police officers in arresting drunk drivers, and jury findings of not guilty.
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nal charges.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new California drunk driving law substantially alters the
law in three significant areas. The new legislation established a
new crime of driving with a blood-alcohol level of .10 or more.
This new crime, in effect, creates a conclusive presumption that a
person is guilty of "driving under the influence" when he drives
with a blood-alcohol level of .10 or more. The new legislation has
also attempted to curtail the practice of plea bargaining from a
misdemeanor "driving under the influence" charge to a plea of
"guilty" to reckless driving. When such a plea bargain occurs, the
reckless driving conviction constitutes a prior conviction requiring sentence enhancement if the person is convicted of a second
"misdemeanor drunk driving" offense within five years. The new
legislation has also significantly increased the penalties for a conviction of drunk driving and provides that the minimum penalties
in the legislation are mandatory. Contrary to what the public has
been led to believe, however, there is no mandatory jail sentence
for first time misdemeanor offenses.
The new drunk driving law presents a number of constitutional
issues. The most serious is that the legislation creates a conclusive presumption that a person with a blood-alcohol level of .10 or
more is guilty of drunk driving. This conclusive presumption
clearly violates the accused's presumption of innocence. A trial
court may cure this defect by instructing the jury that blood-alcohol level is one circumstance of many that they are to consider in
reaching their verdict and that they may acquit the defendant despite the blood-alcohol evidence.
The impact of the drunk driving legislation on the incidence of
drunk driving has been disappointing. While the legislation did
appear to reduce the number of drunk drivers during January, arrests for drunk driving have now reached, and in some cases have
surpassed, the number of arrests during 1981. The failure of the
legislation to act as an effective deterrent to drunk driving may be
traced to a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact that increasing the severity of punishment for drunk driving has no effect on the incidence of drunk driving. The more effective
approach is to provide swift and certain punishment to people arrested for drunk driving. As such, there is a compelling need for

the legislature to re-evaluate the method by which the legal system handles the drunk driver. In this regard, there are two proposals which merit close consideration. One approach would be a
program which would increase and maintain the public's perception that wide-scale enforcement is in effect, and that swift, sure,
and severe punishment will follow all drunk driving offenses. An
alternative approach would be to establish an administrative
agency capable of providing swift and certain penalties to people
charged with their first "misdemeanor drunk driving" offense.
DOUGLAS CAIAFA
A.

RANDALL FARNSWORTH
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